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Abstract
In recent years it has become increasingly clear that risk aversion cannot by itself explain how 
and why individuals purchase insurance. From the perspective of risk aversion, individuals tend 
to purchase insurance when they should not, refuse to purchase insurance when they should, 
prefer sub-optimal payouts, and allow irrelevant considerations to infl uence their insurance 
preferences. This article considers the normative implications of these ‘insurance demand 
anomalies’. It argues that many observed deviations from traditional theory are likely the 
result of mistakes, in the sense that consumers would act differently if they possessed perfect 
information and cognitive resources. From this perspective, regulatory interventions designed 
to improve consumer decision-making about insurance are potentially desirable. At the same 
time, the article argues that some insurance demand anomalies may actually refl ect sophisticated 
consumer behaviour. In some cases, seemingly puzzling insurance decisions may help consumers 
manage emotions such as anxiety, regret and loss aversion, while in other cases they may 
represent valuable commitment strategies. Because consumers’ insurance decisions may refl ect 
sophisticated rather than mistaken decision-making, regulatory interventions that limit consumer 
choice are normatively troubling. Given these confl icting explanations for risk aversion’s failure 
as a descriptive theory of consumer demand in insurance markets, the article explores a spectrum 
of ‘libertarian-paternalistic’ regulatory interventions. It argues that regulatory strategies that 
aim to encourage presumptively welfare-maximising insurance decisions without restricting 
individual choice represent a promising and normatively defensible opportunity for improving 
consumer behaviour in insurance markets.
For almost half a century, economists assumed, with little empirical foundation, that 
the purchase of insurance was explained entirely by risk aversion within Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT).1 According to this theory, people who purchase insurance enjoy 
diminishing marginal utility as their wealth increases, meaning that each additional 
dollar improves their well-being less than the previous dollar.2 As a result, people can 
maximize their expected utility by spending a small amount in the present to protect 
against the risk of a large monetary loss in the future, so long as the expected value of 
the future payment is roughly equivalent to the present payment.3
 It ha s become increasingly clear in recent years that risk aversion alone cannot 
explain how and why individuals purchase insurance.4 From t he perspective of risk 
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1 See generally J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1964). 
Technically, EUT does not require any particular utility function. Recent behavioural work has sought to 
explain insurance decisions by including within the utility function unconventional variables, such as the 
prospect of regret or loss aversion. Such models do not explain insurance by reference to risk aversion, even 
if they do fall within the general domain of EUT. As such, references to ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ EUT in the 
text should not be understood to encompass such recent behavioural innovations to EUT.
2 See S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004) at 596.
3 See J. Mossin, ‘Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 533.
4 From a descriptive perspective, the failure of traditional EUT is not cabined to insurance decisions 
but applies to individual risk-based decisions more generally. The leading competing theory of individual 
decision-making under uncertainty is Prospect Theory. See generally D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, 
‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 263 at 263-270; A. Tversky 
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aversion, individuals tend to purchase insurance when they should not, refuse to purchase 
insurance when they should, strongly prefer sub-optimal insurance payout schemes and 
allow completely irrelevant considerations to dramatically infl uence their insurance 
purchasing preferences.5 Although these deviations from EUT are often labelled 
‘anomalies’, their number and persistency have come to belie this characterisation.6
 Despite the wealth of empirical research documenting insurance demand anomalies, 
the normative implications of this consumer behaviour have received only minimal 
attention from scholars and policymakers.7 To be sure, some commentators suggest 
that deviations from traditional EUT raise regulatory concerns.8 Underlying this 
sentiment is often the unarticulated notion that consumers who select insurance in 
ways that are inconsistent with standard theory are making a mistake, meaning that 
they would behave differently were it not for cognitive or informational limitations.9 
Other pr ominent commentators have suggested that consumer behaviour inconsistent 
with traditional EUT cannot always be dismissed as mere mistakes, but may actually 
refl ect sophisticated and informed choice.10 From the perspective of welfare economics, 
this conceptualisation of consumer demand for insurance raises thorny normative 
implications for the role of regulatory intervention.11
 This article explores these competing theories of consumer demand for insurance. 
Part 1 begins with a review of empirical research documenting four observed insurance 
demand anomalies that potentially raise regulatory issues. First, consumer demand for 
catastrophe insurance is generally bimodal, with consumers tending either to exhibit 
surprisingly little interest in such insurance or bizarre enthusiasm for it. Second, 
consumers routinely purchase insurance against small fi nancial risks that imply 
preposterous levels of risk aversion. Third, consumers typically prefer excessively low 
and D. Kahneman, ‘Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representations under Uncertainty’ (1992) 
5 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 297. For another interesting general theory of decision-making under 
uncertainty, see D. Krantz and H. Kunreuther, ‘Goals and Plans in Decision Making’ (2007) 2 Judgment 
and Decision Making 137. See also G. Lowenstein et al., ‘Risk as Feelings’ (2001) 127 Psychological 
Bulletin 267 at 267-271.
5 See generally Part 1 infra.
6 In the words of two leading insurance economists, deviations from traditional EUT ‘are not minor 
anomalies but refl ect a systematic tendency for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.’ D. 
Cutler and R. Zeckhauser, ‘Extending the Theory to Meet the Practice in Insurance’, Brookings-Wharton 
Papers on Financial Services (2004) at 3, available at: <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/brookings-wharton_
papers_on_fi nancial_services/v2004/2004.1cutler.html> (last visited March 15, 2010). Matthew Rabin and 
Richard Thaler describe risk aversion-based explanations of insurance decisions as ‘plainly wrong and 
frequently misleading’. See M. Rabin and R. Thaler, ‘Anomalies: Risk Aversion’ (2001) 15 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 219 at 230. They analogise economists’ defences of traditional EUT to a Monty 
Python sketch in which a pet shop owner attempts to convince a disgruntled customer that the bird he 
recently purchased is not dead, despite the customer beating the dead parrot on the store counter. Id., at 230.
7 See, for example, Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 43 (stating that the normative relevance of 
consumer insurance anomalies ‘is a task for future efforts’); Krantz and Kunreuther, above n. 4, at 163 
(briefl y discussing the prescriptive implications of their theory of consumer demand anomalies from the 
standpoint of how consumers should purchase insurance, but noting that their ‘framework … raises a host 
of diffi cult prescriptive questions [and] we provide a sampler here but note that most of the answers are 
beyond the scope of this paper and should be addressed by future research’); Rabin and Thaler, above n. 6, 
at 230 (noting that traditional EUT is quite attractive as a normative theory of how to purchase insurance 
without exploring this issue). This is noteworthy given that the original developers of EUT, Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, viewed it as a normative theory. See C. Guthrie, ‘Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret 
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior’ (1999) University of Illinois Law Review 43 at 49.
8 The commentator who has explored this issue most thoroughly is Howard Kunreuther. See generally 
nn. 13, 16, 18, 68, 131.
9 See, for example, E. Johnson et al., ‘Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions’ (1993) 
7 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 35 at 36 (‘The recognition that consumer perceptions and decision 
processes are imperfect and manipulable could be used to support insurance regulation and prohibition of 
certain types of insurance.’). For further discussion of the defi nition of a mistake, see Part 2 infra.
10 Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 43 (‘Given the importance that [insurance] consumers attach 
to minimizing regret and anxiety, there is a strong argument that such concepts should be given a role in 
our normative theories.’); Krantz and Kunreuther, above n. 4, at 141 (‘When important and stable extra-
fi nancial goals motivate insurance purchase, one might regard the decision as anomalous from a fi nancial 
decision, but quite rational from a broader perspective of multiple goals.’).
11 See Part 3 infra for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
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deductibles from the perspective of standard theory. Finally, consumers occasionally 
(though infrequently) purchase non-pecuniary loss insurance in ways that cannot be 
convincingly explained by anticipated changes in their marginal utility of wealth.
 Part 2 then offers two competing explanations for these deviations from standard 
EUT. First, it argues that most anomalous demand in insurance likely refl ects consumers’ 
ignorance about insurance and limited cognitive resources when it comes to making 
insurance purchasing decisions. Second, and perhaps more controversially, it claims 
that some component of this demand may refl ect consumers’ sophisticated management 
of their emotional needs. In particular, consumers deviating from the classical prescripts 
of EUT may be using insurance to provide themselves with ‘peace of mind’, reduce 
regret from uninsured losses and counteract the negative feelings associated with loss. 
In other cases, they may make seemingly irrational insurance decisions that offset the 
consequences of their limited self-control.
 Part 3 concludes by considering various ‘libertarian-paternalistic’ approaches to 
improving insurance markets.12 It argues that su ch regulatory strategies, which aim 
to improve consumer decision-making without limiting individual choice, are an 
appropriate response to Part 2’s confl icting diagnoses of consumer decision-making in 
insurance markets. That is because they simultaneously reduce the likely incidence of 
consumer mistakes while allowing consumers that are not making mistakes to continue 
purchasing insurance according to their genuine preferences.
1 Deviations from Traditional Expected Utility Theory in Insurance 
Demand
Over the last several decades, empirical research from both the laboratory and the real 
world has repeatedly shown that the traditional EUT explanation of risk aversion does 
a poor job of explaining consumers’ actual insurance decisions. This part provides a 
brief overview of four deviations from standard theory in insurance markets: bimodal 
consumer demand for catastrophe insurance, enthusiasm for insurance against small 
fi nancial risks, preferences for low deductibles and willingness to purchase non-
pecuniary loss insurance.13
1.1 Bimodal Demand  for Catastrophe Insurance
Traditional EUT fares poorly in its predictions about how individuals purchase insurance 
against low-probability, high-magnitude risks. According to standard theory, consumers 
should generally fi nd insurance against such risks desirable, so long as premiums 
are actuarially reasonable.14 This is because mone y should have a larger impact on 
individuals’ overall utility after a large fi nancial loss than it has prior to such a loss. 
Differences in consumers’ willingness to purchase such insurance should be attributable 
either to different degrees of risk-aversion or levels of wealth.
12 See C. Sunstein and R. Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1159; C. Sunstein and R. Thaler, Nudge (2008). For criticisms of and responses to 
libertarian paternalism, see E. Glaeser, ‘Paternalism and Psychology’ (2007) 73 University of Chicago Law 
Review 133 at 150; G. Mitchell and J. Klick, ‘Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive 
Hazards’ (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1620 at 1627-1641; G. Mitchell, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is an 
Oxymoron’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 1245; C. Hill, ‘Anti-Anti-Anti Paternalism’ 
(2007) 2 New York University Journal of Law and Liberty 44.
13 For a more complete description of seeming anomalies in individuals’ purchasing decisions, see H. 
Kunreuther and M. Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior (2005) at 27-49; W.H. Van 
Boom, ‘Insurance Law and Economics: An Empirical Perspective’, in M. Faure and F. Stephen (eds.), 
Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation (2008).
14 Indeed, according to traditional EUT, risk-averse individuals should always purchase insurance that 
is fairly priced. See L. Eeckhoudt et al., Economic and Financial Decisions Under Risk (2005) at 51 
(describing Mossin’s theorem).
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 Contrary to these predictions, individuals frequently display surprisingly little interest 
in purchasing catastrophe insurance.15 For instance, researchers found that homeowners 
living in earthquake-prone areas of California had not invested even minimal effort to 
learn about available insurance options.16 Individuals’ apathy towa rds insurance was 
not a product of any expectation that they would receive post-disaster government aid.17 
This pattern persists even in markets where insurance premiums are state subsidised. 
For example, many property owners living in fl ood-prone areas do not purchase federal 
fl ood insurance, which is both highly subsidised and often legally required.18
 At the same time, consume rs do display substantial enthusiasm for some forms of 
catastrophe insurance, depending on how the underlying risks are framed or the salience 
of those risks.19 Thus, consumers are sometimes strongly drawn to terrorism insurance 
and insurance against so-called ‘dread diseases’ such as cancer.20 They also tend to 
display relative enthusiasm for the purchase of earthquake and fl ood insurance in the 
immediate aftermath of earthquakes and fl oods, respectively.21
 This consumer interest in li mited forms of insurance against low-probability, high-
magnitude risks often defy explanatory factors based on traditional EUT, such as 
differences in the magnitude or probability of potential losses. One study documented 
that a group of subjects was willing to pay more than twice as much for fl ight insurance 
covering ‘terrorism’ and ‘mechanical failure’ than similar groups of subjects were 
willing to pay for fl ight insurance covering losses for ‘any reason’. The study reported 
similar distortions in subjects’ willingness to pay for general health insurance compared 
to health insurance for a specifi c, vivid ailment and for general trip insurance compared 
to travel terrorism insurance.22
1.2 Enthusiasm for Insurance Against Small Financial Risks
Ironically, risk aversion also does not fare well at predicting individuals’ willingness 
to purchase insurance against small fi nancial risks. According to traditional EUT, such 
insurance should generally be undesirable. This is because low-magnitude losses do 
not meaningfully impact overall wealth levels, and hence the expected impact of an 
insurance payout on overall utility should not differ substantially from the impact on 
15 See generally G. McClelland et al., ‘Insurance For Low Probability Events: A Bimodal Response to 
Unlikely Events’ (1993) 7 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 95 at 95-96.
16 See H. Kunreuther et al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons (1978) at 236-243. 
Recent evidence confi rms these results: prior to the 1989 California earthquake, 34% of homeowners told 
surveyors that earthquake insurance was not necessary. See R. Palm, Earthquake Insurance: A Longitudinal 
Study of Homeowners Insurance in California (1995). After the earthquake, only 5% of respondents said 
earthquake insurance was not necessary. Id.
17 See Kunreuther et al., above n. 16.
18 See id. See generally H. Kunreuther and M. Pauly, ‘Neglecting Disaster: Why Don’t People Insure 
Against Large Losses?’ (2006) 20 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 at 6 (discussing consumers’ tendency 
to not purchase insurance for low-probability, high-loss events).
19 The relevance of framing to consumers’ insurance decisions extends well beyond the context of low-
probability insurance. For instance, consumers are much more willing to purchase any form of insurance if 
it is framed as ‘insurance’ rather than as payment to avoid a loss. See P.J.H. Schoemaker and H. Kunreuther, 
‘An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions’ (1979) 46 Journal of Risk and Insurance 603 at 612; J.C. 
Herschey and P.J.H. Shoemaker, ‘Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected 
Utility Analysis’ (1980) 47 Journal of Risk and Insurance 111 at 130.
20 Johnson et al., above n. 9, at 35. Individuals in the United States have demonstrated surprising 
enthusiasm for terrorism insurance, especially in the wake of 9/11. See Wharton Risk Center, TRIA and 
Beyond: Terrorism Risk Financing in the United States (2005).
21 See P. Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2000) at 14.
22 Johnson et al., above n. 9, at 35. Earlier research has similarly suggested that people pay signifi cantly too 
much for fl ight insurance. See R. Eisner and R. Strotz, ‘Flight Insurance and the Theory of Choice’ (1961) 
69 Journal of Political Economy 355. Some recent research suggests that risk preferences may not, in fact, 
be stable across contexts and that people exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductibles than in their 
auto deductibles. See L. Barseghyan et al., ‘Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from 
Insurance Data’ (June 2009), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1220663>. 
This fi nding itself is inconsistent with traditional EUT.
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utility of paying insurance premiums.23 If such insurance were actuarially fair,  a risk-
averse person might nonetheless be slightly inclined, or at least indifferent, to purchasing 
it. But, in practice, loading costs for insurance against small fi nancial risks are generally 
high due to the frequency with which claims must be managed. As a result, the level of 
risk aversion necessary to explain the rational purchase of these forms of insurance is 
implausible.24
 In contrast to these theoretical predictions, consumers routinely display substantial 
enthusiasm for insurance against small fi nancial risks. One study documented that 57% 
of households who were offered insurance against the risk of having to pay repair costs 
for their phone lines purchased it. The cost of such insurance was 45 cents per month, 
whereas its expected value was 26 cents per month.25 A similar willingness to insure 
against low-magnitude losses is apparent in ordinary homeowners and automobile 
policies, which provide coverage for fallen tree removal, broken windshield repair 
and rental car fees.26 Perhaps the most omnipresent example is the extended product 
warranty for consumer durables, which numerous stores successfully offer to customers 
at exorbitant rates.27 Laboratory experiments have similarly documented the preference 
of subjects for insuring against high-probability, low-cost events.28
1.3 Preferences for Low Deductibles
According to traditional EUT, policyholders should generally favour coverage 
with large deductibles.29 In part, the logic for this result mirrors the logic for why 
policyholders should not demand insurance for small fi nancial risks: because even 
large deductible levels are typically small relative to individuals’ overall wealth, opting 
for such deductibles does not increase the risk of a large loss but does dramatically 
decrease loading costs. But large deductibles also disproportionately reduce the costs 
of insurance coverage in two ways. First, they reduce moral hazard by requiring the 
policyholder to pay the fi rst dollars of any loss.30 Second, they may limit the risk of 
adverse selection because low deductibles are disproportionately valuable to high-risk 
individuals.31 These factors contribute to make the cost savings from high deductibles 
much greater, on the whole, than the benefi t conferred by a low deductible.
 Despite these potential savings, consumers routinely select surprisingly low 
deductibles. A recent study found that a substantial majority of consumers in both 
automobile and homeowners insurance markets select a deductible of $500 rather than 
$1,000, even though the marginal cost of this additional coverage is approximately 
four times its expected value.32 At least partially in response to these pre ferences, 
23 See M. Rabin, ‘Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion’, in D. Kahneman 
and A. Tversky (eds.), Choices, Values and Frames (2000) 202 at 202-208.
24 See id.
25 C. Cicchetti and J.A. Dubin, ‘A Microeconomic Analysis of Risk Aversion and the Decision to Self-
Insure’ (1994) 102 Journal of Political Economy 169 at 172.
26 See D. Schwarcz, ‘A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance’ (2007) 48 
William and Mary Law Review 1389 at 1414.
27 See Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 3, 25-28 (‘[I]nsurance against small-cost consumer durables is 
among the most profi table items sold by commercial electronics stores’, yet ‘the purchase of this insurance 
seems hard to justify.’).
28 One well-known study simulated an insurance decision by having subjects choose a red or blue ball from 
an urn. See Slovic, above n. 21, at 56-57. The blue ball represented a hazard against which study participants 
could insure. By varying the ratio of colored balls, experimenters could manipulate the probability of loss. 
Contrary to standard theory, subjects strongly preferred to insure against high-probability, low-cost events. 
See id. This result was consistent among different populations and was replicated across a number of 
different experimental designs. Id., at 62-67.
29 Mossin, above n. 3, at 561-563.
30 See K. Abraham, Distributing Risk (1986) at 15.
31 See P. Siegelman, ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat’ (2004) 113 Yale 
Law Journal 1223 at 1265-1266.
32 See J. Sydnor, ‘(Over)insuring Modest Risks’ (Draft, December 2009) at 2-3, available at: <http://
wsomfaculty.case.edu/sydnor/deductibles.pdf> (last visited March 15, 2010); see also Kunreuther and 
Pauly, above n. 13, at 28.
28 DANIEL SCHWARCZ 
some personal lines insurers do not offer deductibles higher than $1,000 for property 
coverage, and most such insurers do not offer deductibles at all for liability insurance.33 
Consumers’ preferences for low deductibles also appear to be relatively intense. Thus, 
massive consumer outcry in the 1970s forced the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner 
to withdraw a proposal to raise the minimum deductible for automobile policies from 
$50 to $100.34
1.4 Willingness to Purchase Insurance against Non-Pecuniary Losses
Most forms of insurance do not compensate consumers for losses that neither directly 
nor indirectly decrease wealth levels.35 For instance, homeowners insurance does not 
c ompensate policyholders for the emotional trauma that often accompanies the loss of 
one’s home and personal possessions. Law and economics scholars often attribute the 
absence of such non-pecuniary loss insurance to consumer disinterest.36 Increasingly, 
though, research suggests that supply-side problems may better explain the general 
absence of non-pecuniary loss insurance.37 In fact, in at least two markets where non-
pec uniary loss insurance is offered, consumers enthusiastically purchase it.38
 Consider fi rst the market for juvenile life insurance. According to the American 
Council of Life Insurers, approximately 15% of people under 18 have some form of life 
insurance.39 Another source reports that two million stand-alone juvenile life insurance 
policies were sold in 2004, with premiums averaging $213 per year and policies paying 
out an average death benefi t of $35,310.40 Of course, it is possible that this form of 
insurance protects policyholders against fi nancial risk.41 The death of a child may 
lead to funeral expenses, therapy costs and a temporary inability to work.42 But these 
explanations are largely implausible. In fact, the death of a child generally results in a 
33 See Sydnor, above n. 32, at 7, 9-10; Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 13, at 28.
34 See J.D. Cummins and S.N. Weisbart, The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Agency 
Performance (1978).
35 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘non-pecuniary loss’ refers only to losses that neither directly 
nor indirectly impact wealth. As such, losses that do not directly impact wealth but which increase the need 
for wealth because they create the need for medical care or similar expenditures that are necessary to restore 
one’s physical or emotional capacities are classifi ed as pecuniary losses. Cf. S. Shavell, Economic Analysis 
of Accident Law (1987) at 228-231 (defi ning non-pecuniary loss insurance).
36 This claim if often made in connection with the desirability of emotional distress damages in tort law 
from the perspective of ideal insurance (rather than deterrence). See G. Priest, ‘The Current Insurance 
Crisis and Modern Tort Law’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1521 at 1547; Shavell, above n. 35, at 230-231.
37 See J. Hanson and S. Croley, ‘The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents’ (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 
1785 (exploring the supply-side problems that insurers may face in providing such insurance). Two recent 
experiments provide direct support for consumers’ willingness to purchase non-pecuniary loss insurance. 
One recent study found that a substantial majority of research subjects treated insurance against pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary losses exactly the same when presented with a set of hypothetical insurance transactions. 
See R. Avraham, ‘Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages be Abolished from Tort Law? More Experimental 
Evidence’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 941 at 962. In a second study, subjects were given 
the option of purchasing an insurance policy that would pay the $200 purchase price of a vase if it broke 
in shipment. Half of the subjects were told that they ‘fell in love with the vase at fi rst sight’ and it ‘feels 
precious to you’, while the other half was told, ‘you don’t have any special feeling for this vase’. C. 
Hsee and H. Kunreuther, ‘The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions’ (2000) 20 Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 141 at 149. Subjects were willing to pay almost twice as much to insure the highly-valued vase, 
compared to the less-valued vase. Further experiments revealed that this effect could not be explained by 
subjects’ perceived wealth differentials in the two treatments; the result replicated itself even when the item 
to be insured had zero market value. See id., at 151-152.
38 See generally Hanson and Croley, above n. 37.
39 See Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 40.
40 See J. Martin, ‘Kids Life Insurance: A Pint-Sized Mistake’, Money (September 28, 2005). Life insurance 
for children is even more frequently sold as a rider to an adult’s life insurance policy. Id.
41 In some cases, there may be other reasons to purchase juvenile life insurance. In particular, because 
many policies do not require medical tests, parents of a child with potential health problems may wish 
to purchase coverage to ensure that life insurance is available to the child in his or her adult years. This 
explanation, however, is clearly insuffi cient to explain the prevalence of juvenile life insurance.
42 See V. O’Connell, Wall Street Journal (January 30, 1996) at 12C (describing insurers’ marketing of life 
insurance for children).
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substantial increase in wealth because it relieves parents of child-rearing costs. Recent 
estimates place this cost at $9,000 a year for families earning less than $57,000 annually, 
$12,000 a year for families earning between $57,000 and $98,500 annually and $21,000 
a year for families with a yearly income above $98,500.43 Moreover, the fi nancial costs 
of a child’s death are generally small: most health insurance plans cover mental health 
treatment expenses,44 and federal law provides some measure of protection to employees 
who need to take bereavement leave.45 Although the average funeral costs $6,500, one 
can plan a modest funeral for substantially less.46
 Another example of commonly purchased non-pecuniary loss insurance is Uninsured/
Underinsured Motorists Coverage (‘UIM’ coverage).47 In the event of an accident with 
an uninsured or underinsured motorist, UIM coverage pays the amount the insured 
would have been able to recover from a tortfeasor with suffi cient liability insurance to 
pay for damages.48 Because tort plaintiffs can recover emotional distress damages from 
defendants, policyholders with UIM coverage can also recover insurance proceeds for 
emotional distress (in addition to fi nancial losses).49 Admittedly, the relative percentage 
of UIM payouts that are compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not clear, as the average 
UIM payment is approximately the same as average economic loss.50 But UIM coverage 
is designed so that there are certainly some, and perhaps many, cases where payments 
exceed economic loss.
 Consumers’ apparent demand for insurance against non-pecuniary losses is not 
necessarily incompatible with traditional EUT.51 This is because it is possible that a non-
pecuniary loss might increase an individual’s marginal utility of wealth.52 An emotional 
loss might make fi nancial expenditures more desirable, as in the case of so-called ‘retail 
43 M. Lino and A. Carlson, United States Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutrition Policy and 
Promotion, Expenditure on Children by Families 2009 (Pub. No. 1528-2008 2009), available at: <http://
www.cnpp.usda.gov/ExpendituresonChildrenbyFamilies.htm> (last visited March 15, 2010). These fi gures 
exclude college costs and other parental expenditures made for children after age 17. Admittedly, families 
without savings or any sources of fi nancing might fi nd it hard to pay for funeral expenses, but a quick 
internet search suggests that many funeral service providers offer fi nancing to consumers.
44 The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Act of 2008, which took effect on January 1, 2010, requires 
that employer-provided health insurance plans offer mental health benefi ts that are no more restrictive 
than those requirements placed on medical benefi ts. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2008). Additionally, many states 
have similar laws. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Mandating or Regulating 
Mental Health Benefi ts (February 2009), available at: <http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/
StateLawsMandatingorRegulatingMentalHealthB/tabid/14352/Default.aspx> (last visited March 15, 
2010).
45 See, for example, Stubl v. T.A. Systems, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that the 
Family Medical Leave Act (‘FMLA’) applies to parents suffering from depression due to the loss of a 
child). However, it is notable that the FMLA only provides leave to individuals whose grief rises to a 
signifi cant level of clinical depression. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Furthermore, the FMLA only provides 
for unpaid leave. Id.
46 See C. Solomon, ‘Plan a Funeral for $800 or Less’, MSN Money, available at: <http://articles.
moneycentral.msn.com/RetirementandWills/PlanYourEstate/HowToPlanAFuneral.aspx>.
47 See Hanson and Croley, above n. 37, at 1862-1863; Tom Baker, ‘Insurance in Sociolegal Research’ 
(working paper on fi le with the author).
48 See R. Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law (2001, 3rd ed.) at 1034.
49 See id.
50 See Insurance Research Council, Closed Claims Study (2002) at 72.
51 See P.J. Cook and D.A. Graham, ‘The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable 
Commodities’ (1977) 91 Quarterly Journal of Economics 143.
52 See Shavell, above n. 35, at 228-231. As Shavell explains, ‘[i]f nonpecuniary losses will not result in 
a person valuing money more, then under the expected utility maximizing insurance policy he will not 
arrange for coverage against the nonpecuniary losses; coverage will be restricted to pecuniary losses, if 
any. Thus a person might not insure against the loss of his family portrait and might limit coverage against 
loss of a toe to medical expenses.’ Id., at 230. By contrast, ‘[i]f the value a person will place on money will 
increase as a result of a nonpecuniary loss, optimal insurance coverage will exceed pecuniary loss. Thus a 
person may purchase greater coverage against the possibility of being crippled than an amount equal only 
to the costs of medical treatment and forgone earnings.’ Id. See also A. Schwartz, ‘Proposals for Products 
Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 353 at 362-367; P.M. Danzon, ‘Tort 
Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 517 
at 521.
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therapy’. Similarly, a loss of physical capabilities might increase the marginal utility 
of wealth, for instance, by encouraging an avid athlete to substitute towards more 
expensive hobbies.53
 However, these explanations for consumers’ demand for juvenile life insurance and 
UIM insurance are largely implausible. In the case of juvenile life insurance, it is simply 
hard to imagine that a child’s death increases the utility people derive from spending 
money.54 This is particularly true given that a child’s death generally increases overall 
wealth levels, which tends to reduce the marginal utility of wealth. In the case of UIM 
insurance, there may indeed be individual instances where a non-pecuniary loss will 
increase the marginal utility of wealth. But it seems telling that UIM insurance does 
not link insurance payments to factors that might plausibly track the subjective value 
of money. Such factors might include whether emotional distress is attributable to the 
temporary experience of physical pain (which should not impact the marginal utility 
of wealth) or to partial or total disability (which might plausibly impact the marginal 
utility of wealth). Simply put, UIM’s provision of full insurance for all forms of pain 
and suffering that are recoverable in tort law seems over-broad if consumers are merely 
trying to transfer wealth to states of the world where they enjoy a comparatively large 
marginal utility of wealth.
2 Competing Explanations for Observed Insurance Demand
Part 1 provides strong evidence that risk aversion within the traditional EUT framework 
poorly describes how individuals tend to make insurance decisions. These deviations 
from standard theory can be explained in two basic ways. The fi rst, which can be 
labelled the mistake hypothesis, explains these insurance demand anomalies by 
reference to consumers’ lack of complete information and/or their limited cognitive 
abilities.55 According to the mistake hypothesis, consumer insurance decisi ons refl ect 
the fact that time is scarce, cognitive resources are fi nite and information is limited.56 If 
these obstacles could be overcome, consumer insurance decisions would better refl ect 
the predictions of traditional EUT. In other words, according to the mistake hypothesis, 
classical EUT is perfectly defensible as a normative theory of insurance purchasing, 
even though it largely fails as a descriptive theory.
 The second explanation for the anomalies canvassed in Part 1 is that they stem not from 
the limits of consumers but from the limits of traditional EUT itself. This explanation, 
which can be labelled the incompleteness hypothesis, is premised on the notion that 
classical EUT fails to fully capture the benefi ts of insurance. Consumer behaviour, from 
53 See Shavell, above n. 35, at 228-231.
54 See G. Priest, ‘The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund’ (2003) 53 
DePaul Law Review 527 at 536-537 (‘It makes no general sense for a parent to reduce the family’s fi nancial 
position while the child is alive in order to enhance its fi nancial position after the child dies; indeed, the 
reverse. Thus, there is no economic reason to purchase life insurance on a child.’).
55 See Sunstein and Thaler (2003), above n. 12, at 1162; see also C. Jolls, C. Sunstein and R. Thaler, ‘A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471 (outlining various 
mistakes that fi t this defi nition). Sunstein and Thaler include in their defi nition of a mistake consumer 
decisions that people would change if they had unlimited self control. This component of their defi nition is 
omitted based on the objection, articulated by Claire Hill, that it is impossible to characterise a lack of self 
control as a true mistake. See Hill, above n. 12, at 446-447. Hill’s argument could be interpreted to extend 
further, to the proposition that it is usually impossible to characterise any decision as a mistake. This, in 
her view, is because preferences are constructed to such a degree that they do not exist outside of their 
informational and cognitive framing. See id., at 447-448. Hill is surely correct that it is often diffi cult to say 
whether or not a particular decision is a result of a mistake, as identifying a mistake requires us to consider 
how a person would have decided in a parallel universe in which they had full information and unlimited 
cognitive resources. That this is diffi cult in individual cases, however, does not mean that the concept of a 
mistake is not normatively useful.
56 See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 18, at 9-16 (developing a model in which consumers rationally 
forego the process of thoroughly investigating their insurance options because of the search costs associated 
with doing so).
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this perspective, is not the result of mistakes driven by limited information or cognition. 
Rather, even sophisticated consumers with full information would deviate from the 
prescripts of standard theory under the incompleteness hypothesis.
 This part argues that the available evidence provides strong support for the mistake 
hypothesis. Much of the ‘anomalous’ insurance demand described in Part 1 appears 
to be driven by consumers’ incomplete information or analytically-limited heuristics. 
Consumers generate systematically incorrect probability assessments and estimates of 
harm, invoke incorrect analytical constructs to measure the value of insurance and even 
make basic mathematical mistakes. Such errors, this part shows, could persist even in 
competitive insurance markets.
 At the same time, this part argues that the incompleteness hypothesis is also a 
plausible explanation for some of the ‘anomalous’ consumer demand observed in real 
insurance markets. It argues that the insurance demand anomalies described in Part 1 
can plausibly be explained as sophisticated consumer behaviour to manage emotions 
such as anxiety, regret and loss aversion. Moreover, the capacity of insurance to address 
these negative emotions is not necessarily an artefact of manipulative insurance sales 
or marketing.57 Rather, it may be a sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of 
consumers to manage emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their agents’) 
sales efforts. Other sophisticated consumer strategies – such as committing to a forced-
savings strategy – may also explain some seemingly irrational consumer behaviour.
2.1 Understanding Consumers’ Bimodal Demand for Catastrophe 
Insurance
The mechanisms underlying consumers’ bimodal demand for catastrophe insurance are 
relatively well understood in the decision-making literature. First, individuals’ strategies 
for assessing probabilities produce systematic biases when it comes to low-probability 
events. Most people tend to assess probabilities based in part on the cognitive salience 
and availability of the underlying event being estimated. Although this heuristic serves 
them well with respect to high-probability events, it produces systematic errors with 
respect to low-frequency events.58 In particular, it results in the overweighting of salient 
low-probability risks such as terrorism, as well as events that have recently occurred. 
At the same time, it leads to the underweighting of mundane low-probability risks such 
as dying in a car accident, as well as risks that have not transpired in recent memory.
 Second, people tend to employ a sequential threshold approach to insurance decision-
making. Under this approach, they refuse to consider the desirability of insurance when 
they perceive the probability of the underlying risk to be below a threshold level.59 
This threshold is different for different people and can itself be manipulated. Unless 
the likelihood of a loss is perceived to cross this threshold, the consumer will not even 
consider the desirability of insuring against it, regardless of its anticipated magnitude.60
 These mechanisms for consumer decision-making about catastrophe insurance 
provide strong support for the mistake hypothesis. Indeed, consumers’ biased estimates of 
low-probability risks are unambiguously mistakes. Simply put, probability assessments 
based on the cognitive availability and salience of a risk will produce objective and 
57 Of course, this is not to suggest that manipulative insurance sales or marketing could not lead one to 
purchase insurance in order to manage emotions. Indeed, insurers may frequently create anxiety where none 
previously existed by virtue of presenting the option of insurance in the fi rst place. These scenarios may 
have important regulatory implications, particularly with respect to the regulation of insurers’ marketing 
practices. See T. Baker, Insurance Regulation and Behavioral Economics (June 4, 2010) (draft on fi le 
with the author). But the point here is merely that insurance can be used to manage emotions that exist 
independently of any manipulative or unfair marketing or sales practices.
58 See Slovic, above n. 21, at 13-14, 107; see generally W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and 
Private Responsibilities for Risk (1995) at 117-122. Various factors can contribute to the salience of a 
low-probability event, including recent instances of the event, media coverage of the event and the effect 
associated with the event. See Johnson et al., above n. 9, at 38.
59 See generally Kunreuther et al., above n. 16, at 241; Slovic, above n. 21, at 56-57.
60 See Slovic, above n. 21, at 56-57.
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systematic errors when applied to low-probability risks. The sequential approach 
to insurance decision-making is similarly consistent with the mistake hypothesis. 
Although this heuristic likely saves time and energy, consumers with infi nite time and 
cognitive resources would not ignore the desirability of insurance when they perceived 
the probability of a risk to fall below some arbitrary threshold. Doing so might result in 
the failure to purchase insurance whose expected benefi t exceeded its expected cost, as 
might be the case when such insurance is governmentally subsidised.61
 Although market forces might mitigate the impact of such mistakes, they would 
not eliminate them. In fact, insurers may even exploit consumers’ biased estimates of 
the probability of salient risks to sell more coverage, as they do when they sell ‘dread 
disease’ insurance or fl ight insurance.62 While insurers might  conversely attempt to help 
consumers overcome mistakes that result in the purchase of too little insurance (as in the 
case of mundane risks), any such efforts would obviously not be fully effective. Perhaps 
even more importantly, private insurers often have little incentive to debias and inform 
consumers in this context, as supply-side problems limit the desirability of selling 
coverage for catastrophic risks.63 As a result, most forms of catastrophic risk insurance 
– including fl ood and earthquake insurance – are largely supplied by the government, 
thereby muting market forces that might correct consumer mistakes.
 While the mistake hypothesis likely explains a large percentage of consumers’ 
bimodal demand for catastrophe insurance, at least some portion of this demand 
may be better explained by the incompleteness hypothesis. In particular, consumers’ 
sequential threshold approach to purchasing catastrophe insurance may actually refl ect 
the sophisticated use of insurance to reduce the anxiety associated with the prospect 
of a potential catastrophic loss.64 There is good evidence that insurance is valuable 
to consumers precisely because it provides ‘peace of mind’.65 Consider consumers’ 
willingness to purchase ‘probabilistic insurance’, which, in the event of a covered loss, 
pays with some probability less than one.66 Subjects fi nd such insurance remarkably 
unattractive, demanding ‘about a 30% reduction in the premium to compensate them for 
a 1% chance that their claim will not be paid’.67 This distaste for probabilistic insurance 
can be explained by its failure to eliminate the anxiety that accompanies contemplating 
the prospect of a loss. Other studies support this interpretation, fi nding that subjects’ 
reported concern that they might lose a valuable object better explained their willingness 
to purchase insurance against that risk than their probability assessments about that 
risk.68
 To the extent that the value of insura nce stems from anxiety reduction, consumers’ 
sequential threshold approach to catastrophe insurance may refl ect sophisticated and 
61 See section 1.1 supra.
62 See J.D. Hanson and D.A. Kysar, ‘Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation’ (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1420.
63 See D. Jaffee and T. Russell, ‘Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks’ (1997) 
64 Journal of Risk and Insurance 205 (explaining why insurers prefer not to insure against catastrophic 
risks).
64 See Krantz and Kunreuther, above n. 4, at 140-141 (‘[P]urchasing fl ight insurance at the airport may, 
for some people, provide “peace of mind” and for the purpose of such anxiety reduction may be preferred 
to drinking alcohol at an airport bar.’).
65 This is consistent with insurers’ marketing practices that associate the company with stability, comfort 
and family. See generally T. Baker, ‘Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims 
Stories and Insurance Contract Damages’ (1994) 72 Texas Law Review 1395 at 1403-1407 (surveying the 
various ‘sales stories’ that insurers use in their advertising, and noting the pervasiveness of themes such as 
promising, trust and security).
66 P. Wakker, R. Thaler and A. Tversky, ‘Probabilistic Insurance’ (1997) 15 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
7 at 9.
67 Id.
68 C. Schade, H. Kunreuther, and K.P. Kass, ‘Probability Neglect and Concern in Insurance Decisions 
with Low Probabilities and High Stakes’ (April 14, 2004), available at: <http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/
risk/downloads/rain%20%20paper%20%20apr01.pdf> (last visited March 15, 2010). See also P. Slovic, B. 
Fischoff and S. Lichtenstein, ‘Informing the Public About the Risks From Ionizing Radiation’ (1981) 41 
Health Physics 589 at 591 (‘[P]eople often attempt to reduce the anxiety generated in the face of uncertainty 
by denying the uncertainty, thus making the risk seem so small that it can safely be ignored or so large that 
it clearly should be avoided.’).
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informed behaviour.69 Consumers’ refusal to investigate insuran ce against risks below 
threshold probability levels can be interpreted as a lack of interest in insurance against 
risks that do not induce anxiety.70 For consumers who are not particularly risk-averse, 
such insurance would genuinely be undesirable under traditional EUT, so long as 
loading costs were non-negligible. By contrast, consumers’ willingness to investigate 
insurance against risks whose perceived probability exceed threshold levels may refl ect 
the fact that such risks generate anxiety that insurance could alleviate.
 Consider the example of earthquake insurance. Suppose that a consumer is not 
worried about earthquakes, perhaps because he perceives himself to live in an area where 
earthquakes are exceedingly unlikely. Even under traditional EUT, such a person may 
rationally decide not to purchase insurance with some loading cost.71 Now consider how 
this person’s behaviour might change in the wake of a salient earthquake. Even though 
he knows that an earthquake is no more likely now than it was before, he frequently 
worries about the effect an earthquake would have on his family, especially when he 
sees a news story about the recent earthquake.72 From the perspective of standard theory, 
he should nonetheless be no more willing to purchase earthquake insurance now than he 
was prior to the recent earthquake. But from the perspective of reducing anxiety, such 
insurance may now be very valuable. 
 In sum, consumers’ bimodal demand for catastrophe insurance can largely be 
attributed to informational or cognitive limitations. But the incompleteness hypothesis 
cannot be rejected based on the available evidence, at least for some consumers. 
Classical EUT fails to account for the anxiety-reducing value of insurance,73 and this 
incompleteness may partially explain why it fails to predict bimodal consumer demand 
for insurance against low-probability, high-magnitude risks. To be sure, specifi c cases 
may be better explained by one hypothesis or the other: clearly the person who pays 
more for terrorism insurance than insurance against all risks is making a mistake. But, 
in the aggregate, some component of consumers’ bimodal demand for catastrophe 
insurance may refl ect sophisticated decision-making rather than systematic mistakes.
2.2 Understanding Consumer Demand for Insurance Against Small 
Financial Risks
Consumers’ enthusiasm for insurance against small fi nancial risks is less well understood 
than their bimodal demand for catastrophe insurance. The most intuitive explanation 
for this phenomenon is that consumers overestimate the probability of loss in these 
situations and thus think they are getting a ‘good deal’.74 But this explanation does not 
withstand scrutiny. Firs t, the extent to which consumers would need to overestimate 
probabilities in order to believe they were breaking even by purchasing insurance is 
often quite large.75 This is because consumers typically purchase insurance against small 
69 For a related point in the administrative law context, see M. Adler, ‘Fear Assessment: Cost Benefi t 
Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety’ (2004) 79 Chicago-Kent Law Review 977 (arguing that cost-
benefi t analysis in the regulatory context should include fear assessment).
70 See Slovic, above n. 21, at 56-57.
71 See Eeckhoudt et al., above n. 14, at 5, 45-47. An alternative explanation, which is not strictly consistent 
with traditional EUT, is that individuals budget specifi c amounts for insurance purchases and consequently 
often believe that they cannot afford additional insurance. See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 13, at 19-20.
72 Of course, one might object that people’s worries are themselves irrational. But the point here is merely 
that the decision to purchase insurance as a means of managing these emotions is not itself a mistake. 
Whether or not the emotions one is seeking to manage are themselves somehow irrational does not impact 
this narrower question.
73 It is possible to amend classical EUT such that one’s utility function incorporates the anxiety-reducing 
function of insurance.
74 See B.P. Pashigan, L. Schkade, and G. Menefee, ‘The Selection of an Optimal Deductible for a Given 
Insurance Policy’ (1966) 39 Journal of Business 35.
75 Z. Shapira and I. Venezia, ‘On the Preferences for Full-Coverage Policies: Why Do People Buy Too 
Much Insurance?’ (2008) 29 Journal of Economic Psychology 747 (noting that people would need to believe 
that accidents were four times more probable than they are for overestimation to explain their preferences 
for low deductibles).
34 DANIEL SCHWARCZ 
fi nancial risks at the time of sale, as an add-on to a primary purchase. Competition to 
supply such insurance consequently tends to be minimal, producing large gaps between 
the cost of this insurance and its expected payouts.76 Second, people actually tend to 
do a good job of estimating probabilities with respect to risks that occur frequently and 
can be observed.77 Third, some consumers – though perhaps not many – presumably 
understand that companies would not offer insurance unless the cost of buying it 
exceeded the expected payout.78
 A more plausible explanation is that consumers’ demand for insurance against 
small fi nancial risks stems from ‘mental accounting’.79 Mental accounting posits that 
individuals tend to evaluate risks in isolation, without appreciating the impact that 
external factors may have on those risk evaluations.80 Consequently, a risk that is small 
in the context of one’s overall wealth may appear large in isolation. Mental accounting 
also results in people tending to ignore the ‘law of large numbers’, which states that 
aggregating individual bets will tend to reduce the chances that actual outcomes deviate 
from predicted outcomes.81 Individuals may therefore overweight the desirability of 
insuring against commonly-faced risks. For instance, although an individual may 
perceive risk when considering whether a newly purchased stereo will break, she ought 
to perceive little risk when considering the expected costs of all her consumer goods 
breaking in a particular year.
 The mental accounting explanation supports the mistake hypothesis because it 
suggests that consumers’ enthusiasm for insurance against small fi nancial risks stems 
from their reliance on an imperfect heuristic. Mental accounting may be a valuable 
tool for cognitively limited people to make fi nancially sensible decisions in daily life, 
but it produces systematic errors with respect to fi nancial decisions that importantly 
depend on larger fi nancial context.82 Purchasing insurance against a small fi nancial risk 
is precisely such a decision – whether or not a particular gamble is ‘small’ depends 
on broader context. Were consumers endowed with perfect information and cognitive 
resources, they would surely realise this.
 Market forces do not undermine the mistake-based explanation for consumers’ 
demand for insurance against small fi nancial risks. No fi rm has an incentive to correct 
this type of mistake, because doing so would simply decrease consumers’ willingness 
to purchase insurance against small fi nancial risks. In addition, because this form of 
insurance is typically sold as a voluntary add-on to other products, a fi rm’s attempt to 
capture market share by informing or debiasing consumers would not help that fi rm 
capture additional business. Rather, it would allow consumers to adjust behaviour and 
avoid the costs of such insurance without switching to the debiasing or informing fi rm.83
 Mental accounting, however, is not the only explanation for consumers’ surpr ising 
demand for insurance against small fi nancial risks. Another, non-mutually exclusive, 
explanation is loss aversion.84 Loss aversion posits that the pain individuals feel due 
76 See Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 5.
77 See Sunstein and Thaler (2008), above n. 12, at 74-75; Slovic, above n. 21, at 6-7.
78 See Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 45 (‘People who ask why the store is willing to sell [durable 
goods] insurance will conclude that it is only because the warranty makes money.’).
79 See Rabin and Thaler, above n. 6, at 227.
80 See R. Thaler, ‘Mental Accounting Matters’ (1999) 12 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 183.
81 Slovic, above n. 21, at 11.
82 Thus, Kunreuther and Krantz are clearly correct when they emphasise that mental accounting is not 
always irrational. See Kunreuther and Krantz, above n. 4, at 159. Many heuristics are perfectly rational in 
the sense that they make decision-making easier and generally produce reliable beliefs, but they nonetheless 
systematically produce mistakes in the sense that people would change their mind were all informational 
and cognitive limitations eliminated.
83 For an extended treatment of this argument, see X. Gabaix and D. Laibson, ‘Shrouded Attributes, 
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets’ (2006) 121 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 505.
84 Rabin and Thaler, above n. 6, at 226. To be sure, other explanations – some of which are canvassed 
in other parts of this paper – may also explain consumers’ demand for insurance against high-probability, 
low-magnitude risks. For instance, consumers may purchase such insurance to reduce potential regret 
should a good they purchase break. See section 2.3 infra. The normative implications of this explanation 
are particularly confounding, however, because regret may well be endogenous to the offer of insurance. 
In other words, consumers might not feel regret, or anticipate that they might feel regret, if they were 
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to a loss substantially outweighs (usually by a factor of 2-1) the pleasure they feel 
from an equivalent gain.85 From the perspective of loss aversion, insurance against 
high-probability, low-magnitude risks may help to reduce the potential for emotional 
unpleasantness stemming from losses.86 This depends on whether insurance premiums 
are themselves experienced as a loss. But recent models suggest that many people do 
not experience insurance premiums as losses, in part because such premiums are within 
their control and are not ‘surprise’ events.87
 In contrast to mental accounting, loss aversion is more consistent with the 
incompleteness hypothesis than the mistake hypothesis. Knowing that even small losses 
can cause large amounts of emotional distress, consumers reasonably insure against 
them. By doing so they avoid the potential unpleasantness of paying for the removal of 
a fallen tree or purchasing a replacement iPod through the relatively painless process of 
purchasing insurance.88
2.3 Explaining Consumer Demand for Low Deductibles
A number of different explanations have been advanced for consumers’ persistent 
preference for modest deductibles, most of which are consistent with the mistake 
hypothesis.89 One recent theory suggests that consumers prefer moderate deductibles 
because they are simply miscalculating expected values by incorrectly ‘anchoring’ on 
the size of the deductible.90 According to this theory, insurance consumers calculate the 
expected payout of a policy by fi rst aggregating expected losses and then subtracting the 
deductible from this amount. This approach substantially exaggerates the value of a low 
deductible by failing to take into account its irrelevance if a loss does not occur.91 The 
theory fi nds support in three different experiments, each of which found that subjects 
– students with a background in economics who were provided with an explanation of 
deductibles – consistently made this error in attempting to price policies in a simulated 
insurance market.92
never offered the option of purchasing insurance in the fi rst place. The text of this paper seeks to avoid 
this endogeneity problem by discussing the management of emotions that are largely exogenous to the 
insurance decision.
85 See Tversky and Kahneman, ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model’ (1991) 
106 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1039 at 1053-1054; Tversky and Kahneman, above n. 4 (incorporating 
loss aversion into prospect theory). Whether a prospect is considered a potential ‘loss’ or ‘gain’ depends 
partly on how it is framed.
86 Some studies suggest that consumers may purchase warranties in order to reduce the anxiety they feel 
about the prospect of a product breaking. See R. Hogarth and H. Kunreuther, ‘Decision Making Under 
Ignorance: Arguing With Yourself’ (1995) 10 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 15; Lowenstein et al., above 
n. 4.
87 See B. Koszegi and M. Rabin, ‘Reference Dependent Risk Attitudes’ (2007) 97 American Economics 
Review 1047; Sydnor, above n. 32, at 4.
88 Rabin and Thaler, above n. 6, at 224-226.
89 One researcher directly asked subjects why they chose the deductibles they did. For those who chose 
$50 deductibles, answers included (i) “it was the smallest possible,” (ii) “it gave general protection,” (iii) 
“it was the best deal,” and (iv) “any accident I have will be less than $200 since I am a careful driver.” For 
those who chose $100 deductibles, explanations included (i) their agent or bank chose it, (ii) this option 
was cheaper, (iii) “could always squeeze out $100,” (iv) “makes for fewer claims and that’s better,” and 
(v) “never had any accidents where I had to pay”. See M. L. Murray, ‘Empirical Utility Functions and 
Insurance Consumption Decisions’ (1972) 39 Journal of Risk and Insurance 31. These explanations seem 
to provide more support for the mistake hypothesis than the incompleteness hypothesis, though they are 
obviously diffi cult to interpret. 
90 Shapira and Venezia, above n. 75, at 749, 754-756. One additional explanation, not considered in the 
text, is that consumers substantially overestimate the risk of loss. See Pashigan et al., above n. 74. For similar 
reasons to those described above, this explanation seems unlikely, given the amount of overestimation that 
would be needed and the fact that people are relatively familiar with the risk of a car accident. See Shapira 
and Venezia, above n. 75, at 748 (noting that this explanation assumes that people anticipate two accidents 
a year, which is substantially greater than average).
91 See Shapira and Venezia, above n. 75, at 749.
92 In particular, they priced policies with deductibles at well below the rate necessary to make a profi t, but 
priced policies without deductibles in a manner consistent with earning a reasonable return. See id.
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 A second explanation for consumers’ preference for low deductibles is that 
consumers make an analytical mistake, rather than a numeric mistake, by reasoning 
that a low deductible increases their chances of ‘getting something’ if they suffer a loss. 
Consumers thus mistakenly think of insurance as ‘an investment’.93 This explanation is 
consistent with a number of other observed deviations from traditional EUT that this 
article does not focus on, such as consumer demand for ‘tontines’94 – which bundle 
insurance policies with a lottery – and consumers’ willingness to simultaneously hold 
 annuities and life insurance.95
 These mistake-based explanations are consistent with a competitive marketplace. 
It is certainly conceivable that a competing insurer would fi nd it worthwhile to inform 
or debias consumers who were mistakenly selecting excessively low deductibles.96 But 
such market corrections are unlikely, because newly-sophisticated consumers could 
adjust their behaviour and avoid their deductible mistake without switching to the fi rm 
that invested in debiasing or informing them.97 For example, a State Farm consumer 
who realised that he was making a mistake by maintaining a $500 deductibl e after 
watching an Allstate advertisement trumpeting the cost savings from high deductible 
plans could simply stick with State Farm but increase his deductible to $5,000. Indeed, 
it is much more likely that a consumer would react in this way than switch to Allstate, 
as switching carriers involves transaction costs that staying with the same carrier does 
not.98
 Once again, however, it is at least theoretically possible to explain consumers’ 
preferences for low deductibles in a manner that supports the incompleteness 
hypothesis rather than the mistake hypothesis. Some theorists have speculated that 
consumers’ preference for low deductibles represents a sophisticated strategy to reduce 
regret.99 Regret in this context refers to the disutility that individuals experience when 
their decisions turn out to be  incorrect from an ex post perspective. For instance, a 
person who decides not to purchase an extended warranty (perhaps after having read 
this article) might nonetheless regret that decision if the product she purchases breaks 
shortly after purchase. There is modest direct evidence that avoiding regret infl uences 
various decisions about risk, most notably decisions regarding whether to receive a 
vaccination.100
93 See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 13, at 28; Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6.
94 See T. Baker and P. Siegelman, ‘Enticing Low Risks into the Health Insurance Pool’, University of 
Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-07 (July 28, 2009), available at: 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1350423> (last visited March 15, 2010).
95 See Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 13 (‘[L]ife insurance and annuities cater to mutually exclusive 
circumstances: living too long and living too short. One would not expect the same person to want bother 
instruments in force at the same time.’).
96 See, for example, R. Epstein, ‘Human Errors and Market Corrections’ (2006) 73 University of Chicago 
Law Review 111 at 119-120 (discussing situations in which sellers in a market will invest to correct 
consumer misperceptions).
97 See Gabaix and Laibson, above n. 83. An alternative explanation for why fi rms might not invest in 
informing consumers about the benefi ts of large deductibles is that they anticipate that doing so will result 
in other fi rms doing the same. In that event, the only benefi ts a fi rm can derive from informing consumers in 
this way stem from their position as a fi rst-mover, which may not be large enough to offset the costs of such 
an information campaign. See O. Bar-Gill, ‘The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts’ (2008) 92 
Minnesota Law Review 749 at 760.
98 See Bar-Gill, above n. 97. It is also possible that the hypothetical consumer might pay lower premiums 
by sticking with State Farm than switching. Because a lower percentage of State Farm customers than 
Allstate customers would understand the benefi ts of low deductibles, given Allstate’s advertising campaign, 
the profi ts generated by State Farm’s larger cadre of unsophisticated consumers might partially cross-
subsidise sophisticated consumers. See id.
99 See M. Braun and A. Muermann, ‘The Impact of Regret on the Demand for Insurance’ (204) 71 Journal 
of Risk and Insurance 737. For another attempt to reconcile consumers’ deductible choices with rational 
behaviour, see A. Cohen and L. Einav, ‘Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice’ (2007) 97 
American Economic Review 745 at 779-781.
100 See Braun and Muermann, above note 99, at 743 (discussing T. Conolly and J. Reb, ‘Omission Bias in 
Vaccination Decisions’ (2003) 91 Organizational Behavior and Human Decisions Processes 186).
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 Hypothesising that consumers seek to avoid regret explains a variety of observed 
insurance decisions, including the preference for a relatively low deductible.101 A regret-
averse person would experience disutility from having purchased a high-deductible 
policy if he does indeed suffer a loss. As a result, one can formally show that, under 
certain relatively uncontroversial assumptions, perfectly sophisticated individuals whose 
utility functions incorporate regret-minimisation would ‘hedge their bets’ when loading 
costs are suffi ciently high, purchasing a lower deductible than they otherwise might in 
order to mitigate the prospect of regret.102 Such actors are not making a mistake in the 
sense that they would alter their decisions with better information or more cognitive 
resources.
 Another explanation for consumers’ preferences for low deductibles that supports the 
incompleteness hypothesis is that such deductible choices represent a rational forced-
savings strategy.103 It is well known that consumers often have trouble saving funds for a 
rainy day and, in some cases, tend to exhaust lines of credit because they have diffi culty 
resisting spending.104 For such consumers, purchasing low deductibles may be a rational 
strategy to ensure that they have the fi nancial capacity to make important repairs when 
they need to do so. Unlike a more conventional savings strategy, the benefi t of low 
deductibles is that they involve a single, up-front, investment that is relatively hard to 
undo in the face of temptation. The insurance contract essentially ensures consumers 
that they can only ‘withdraw’ funds in the event of a genuinely serious loss.105
2.4 Explaining Demand for Insurance Against Non-pecuniary Losses
Recall that consumer demand for insurance against non-pecuniary loss is both 
theoretically consistent with traditional EUT and often (wrongly) claimed not to exist 
in practice. For both reasons, few scholars have given much thought to what, other than 
changes in the marginal utility of wealth, might explain demand for non-pecuniary loss 
insurance where it does exist.106 As above, however, explanations consistent with both 
the mistake hypothesis and the incompleteness hypothesis are plausible.
 It is entirely possible that people who demand non-pecuniary loss insurance are 
simply making mistakes. For instance, people may overestimate the extent to which 
a non-pecuniary loss will increase their need for wealth. Thus, those who purchase 
juvenile life insurance may overestimate the likelihood that they will need to (or want 
to) take an extended period of time off work or need extensive therapy in the event of 
a child’s death. Indeed, there is strong evidence that people exaggerate the duration of 
losses that involve high affect (often labelled ‘durability bias’).107 Alternatively, people 
may analyse the need for insurance against a potential risk without distinguishing 
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses at all. This prospect is supported by 
evidence that fi nancial decisions are often refl exive and thus impacted simultaneously 
by logical processes (which might dictate the purchase of insurance for pecuniary risks) 
and emotional processes (which might confl ate pecuniary and non-pecuniary risks given 
101 Others have attempted to use regret to explain the simultaneous preference for insurance and lotteries. 
See, for example, D.E. Bell, ‘Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty’ (1982) 30 Operations Research 
961.
102 See Muermann and Braun, above n. 99, at 739.
103 This is not dissimilar to sophisticated hyperbolic discounters who make rational purchasing decisions 
given their awareness of their susceptibility to hyperbolic discounting, See S. DellaVigna and U. 
Malmendier, ‘Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence’ (2004) 119 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 353.
104 See, for example, A. Littwin, ‘Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference Among Low-
Income Consumers’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 451 at 466-478.
105 In that sense, low deductibles may be similar to one recent set of proposals that would encourage ‘self-
directed cards that would equip consumers to resist more effectively the temptation of credit cards’, for 
instance by allowing consumers to set effective credit limits and other pre-commitment devices. Id., at 455, 
478-500.
106 See Part 1 supra.
107 See D.T. Gilbert et al., ‘Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting’, in T. Gilovich et al. (eds.), Heuristics 
and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (2002).
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that such losses are often felt simultaneously).108 It is also consistent with experimental 
evidence demonstrating that consumers are equally willing to purchase insurance 
against pecuniary and non-pecuniary risks.109 For similar reasons to those canvassed 
earlier, such mistakes might persist even in a competitive marketplace.110
 At the same time, there are at least two potential explanations for consumer demand 
for non-pecuniary loss insurance that are consistent with the incompleteness hypothesis. 
First, people may view insurance as a form of ‘consolation’ against the risk of loss. On 
this account, insurance not only pays money in the event of a loss but also provides a 
form of emotional support through ‘symbolic value’ or ‘redemption for the lost object’.111 
This interpretation explains both peoples’ willingness to pay more for insurance against 
emotionally-valuable items and their related willingness to incur comparatively high 
expenses to recover insurance proceeds in the event of a loss to such items.112 By 
contrast, it is hard to explain peoples’ increased willingness to incur collection costs as 
resulting from some error about the magnitude or probability of the underlying loss.
 Alternatively, it is possible that individuals desire non-pecuniary loss insurance due 
to a desire to distribute resources from a high-utility state of the world to a low-utility 
state of the world. From this perspective, individuals care not just about maximising 
expected utility but also about equalising their overall utility levels across different 
states of the world. In other words, they are risk-averse with respect to bets concerning 
overall utility levels rather than simply with respect to bets involving wealth. Such risk 
aversion stems not from the decreasing marginal utility of wealth but rather from a 
corollary to the Rawlsian notion that it is preferable to distribute goods equally behind a 
veil of ignorance unless departing from that strategy increases the welfare of the worst-
off individual.113
3 Libertarian Paternalism and Regulating Insurance Demand
Part 2 raises competing implications for assessing the optimal role of government in 
response to deviations from the traditional EUT framework in insurance markets.114 On 
one hand, the mistake hypothesis appears to explain most of the observed insurance 
demand anomalies better than the incompleteness hypothesis. To the extent that this is so, 
aggressive regulatory intervention designed to correct these mistakes and foreclose their 
exploitation by fi rms may be warranted.115 The desirability of such intervention would 
turn primarily on practical factors such as the potential effectiveness of regulation, its 
direct and indirect costs and the harm to consumers in the absence of regulation.
 On the other hand, the incompleteness hypothesis provides a theoretically plausible 
explanation for understanding a subset of each consumer demand anomaly identifi ed in 
108 See, for example, P. Bossaerts, ‘What Decision Neuroscience Teaches Us About Financial Decision 
Making’ (2009) 1 Annual Review of Financial Economics 383 (summarising modern literature on the 
subject); H. Tzieropoulos et al., ‘The Rationale Behind Irrational Decisions’, Frontiers in Behavioral 
Neuroscience, Conference Abstract: 41st European Brain and Behaviour Society Meeting 2009; A.W. Lo 
and D.V. Repin. ‘The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing’ (2002) 14 Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience 323.
109 See Avraham, above n. 37, at 946-950.
110 In particular, it is possible that no fi rm would have any incentive to limit consumers’ overestimation 
of the fi nancial consequences of non-pecuniary losses or emphasise the distinction between pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary losses. This is because it is unclear how doing so would enhance the business of the fi rm that 
invested in informing/debiasing such consumers, given that these consumers would not need to switch to 
the other fi rm in order to benefi t from this advice.
111 See Hsee and Kunreuther, above n. 37, at 146-147.
112 See id., at 149-150 (explaining why the market value hypothesis cannot explain the ex post willingness 
to incur costs to collect claims but can theoretically explain ex ante willingness to do so).
113 See Hanson and Croley, above n. 37, at 1812-1834. As Hanson and Croley show, while Rawls’ argument 
applies to how to distribute goods across multiple individuals, it can be extended to the decision about how 
to distribute goods across time with respect to a single individual. See generally id.
114 See Cutler and Zeckhauser, above n. 6, at 20 (noting that ‘behavioral explanations’ for deviations from 
classical EUT ‘make normative analysis diffi cult’, while adding that ‘[f]ortunately for us, our analysis has 
a descriptive, not a normative, purpose’).
115 On the tendency of fi rms to exploit consumer errors, see generally Hanson and Kysar, above n. 62.
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Part 1. Deviations from standard theory may consequently represent, to some degree, 
sophisticated consumer behaviour. This account vastly complicates the normative case 
for regulatory interventions that would limit consumer choice, as it requires pitting 
the interests of some sophisticated consumers against the interests of other consumers 
who are (unknowingly) making mistakes.116 To be sure, one can legitimately question 
the extent to which government regulation should always respect the preferences of 
sophisticated consumers, particularly where these preferences stem from the desire to 
manage emotions such as anxiety, regret and loss aversion.117 But interventions designed 
to manipulate genuine consumer preferences for the benefi t of those consumers are 
more troubling than interventions designed to correct consumer mistakes, because 
they undermine the premise of welfare economics and the related concept of consumer 
sovereignty.118 Rather than confronting the propriety of such regulations directly, this 
part simply assumes that such regulation is less justifi able than regulation designed to 
correct genuine consumer error.119
 Given these competing forces, this part considers various libertarian-paternalistic 
responses to consumer deviations from traditional EUT in insurance markets.120 The basic 
premise of libertarian paternalism is that government interventions can simultaneously 
preserve choice while nudging consumers towards welfare-enhancing decisions. The 
range of such interventions is vast and exists along something of a spectrum between 
libertarianism and paternalism. For instance, product disclosure requirements are closer 
to the libertarian side of the spectrum: because disclosure requirements merely inform 
consumers about objective facts, they are highly consistent with libertarian principles. 
Similarly, selecting presumptively desirable defaults when defaults are impossible to 
avoid is likely unobjectionable to many libertarians.121 Closer to the paternalistic side 
of the spectrum are interventions that seek to take advantage of behavioural tendencies, 
such as status quo bias and framing effects, to ‘nudge’ people towards presumptively 
welfare-promoting decisions and/or ‘debias’ them.122 
 Al though all forms of libertarian paternalism maintain choice, more aggressive forms 
of such regulation are often objectionable to ardent libertarians because they require the 
government to determine presumptively welfare-maximizing choices and attempt to 
‘manipulate’ consumers into making those choices.123 Additionally, aggressive forms of 
116 Of course, it might well be justifi able to limit consumer choice even if that would foreclose genuinely 
attractive options for some consumers. But it is undeniable that identifying when this is the case is 
complicated, turning on the relative effectiveness of alternative regulatory strategies, the harm to consumers 
whose choices were limited, the benefi ts to consumers whose mistakes were prevented and numerous other 
factors.
117 But compare Adler, above n. 69 (arguing that regulatory policy ought to take into account the fear 
associated with death, illness and injury, in addition to the actual risks of these events transpiring).
118 See L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2006). According to the standard welfarist 
account, normative analysis ought to predict the consequences of policies, evaluate their impact on the 
welfare of all relevant persons and then aggregate these welfare impacts. This approach defi nes welfare 
as the satisfaction of preferences. Welfare economics does allow for the possibility that consumers will 
make mistakes. See id., at 411-412. But it rejects the notion that preferences that are not mistakes should 
be manipulated by government actors for consumers’ ‘own good’. ‘To trump preferences is, in essence, to 
redefi ne individuals’ well-being in a manner that substitutes some other preferences – ones that are cleansed, 
so to speak – for individuals’ actual preferences…. But such an approach is troubling from the perspective 
of welfare economics because the moral force and appeal of welfare economics lies in promoting the actual 
well-being of people, not in advancing some hypothetical notion of satisfaction that is distinct from that of 
the individuals who are the objects of our concern.’ See id., at 419-420.
119 For a compelling critique of welfare economics, see D. Farber, ‘What, if Anything, Can Economics Say 
About Equity?’ (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 1791.
120 See Sunstein and Thaler (2003), above n. 12.
121 See Glaeser, above n. 12, at 149-156 (discussing changes in default rules and other forms of soft 
paternalism).
122 See generally Sunstein and Thaler (2008), above n. 12. See also C. Sunstein and C. Jolls, ‘Debiasing 
through the Law’ (2006) 35 Journal of Legal Studies 199.
123 See generally Glaeser, above n. 12, at 150; Mitchell and Klick, above n. 12. Nor are these the only 
criticisms of more aggressive forms of libertarian paternalism. Mitchell and Klick argue that soft paternalism 
can create a cognitive hazard by decreasing people’s incentives to take care and debias themselves. But this 
does not seem like a compelling point in the present context, given the apparent problems that consumers 
experience in the status quo even without such interventions. Additionally, it seems implausible that 
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libertarian paternalism may impose a ‘psychic tax’ on consumers who seek to exercise 
choices inconsistent with encouraged decisions, causing them to experience emotional 
displeasure because they feel as if they acted badly or inappropriately.124 In cases where 
the presumptively welfare-maximizing decision merely decreases a risk rather than 
eliminating it, this psychic tax may also harm people who make the encouraged choices, 
causing them anxiety over the underlying risk. 
 This part considers a variety of libertarian-paternalistic responses to each of the 
four insurance demand anomalies emphasised in this article, including more aggressive 
forms of libertarian paternalism.125 This approach is sensible for several reasons. First, 
as Part 2 suggests, the mistake hypothesis likely explains a much higher proportion of 
the deviations from traditional EUT than the incompleteness hypothesis. Comparatively 
intrusive forms of regulation may therefore be sensible. Second, as explored more fully 
below, disclosure-based responses are limited in their capacity to correct the consumer 
errors described in Part 2, which often do not stem from a lack of information in the fi rst 
place. Finally, designing effective disclosures is notoriously diffi cult, especially under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty.126
 In considering relatively aggressive libertarian-paternalistic interventions, this part 
nonetheless seeks to remain cognizant of the downsides of such regulation, particularly 
the prospect that aggressive forms of libertarian paternalism may impose a psychic 
tax.127 This potential side effect of libertarian paternalism is especially concerning 
given that a key reason for attempting to avoid paternalism with respect to consumers’ 
insurance decisions is that these decisions may be motivated by reasonable emotional, 
or psychic, considerations.
3.1 Libertarian Paternalism and Catastrophe Insurance
As explained in Part 2, many consumers apparently make mistakes in failing to purchase 
insurance against catastrophes such as earthquakes, fl oods and hurricanes. These 
mistakes are particularly troubling because they can increase government costs in the 
wake of a catastrophe.128 They may also create additional, related mistakes. Without 
insurance, individuals often fail to take protective measures against catastrophic risk, 
such as weather-proofi ng their homes, because the cost of doing so is immediate but the 
benefi t is speculative and hard to assess. Insurance coverage can concretise the expected 
benefi ts of such precautions by impacting insurance premiums. In sum, there are 
particularly strong justifi cations for government policies that attempt to limit consumer 
mistakes about disaster insurance, and regulation should conceivably encourage all 
consumers to purchase such insurance in order to limit potential externalities.129
 Although better disclosure could potentially limit consumer mistakes in this 
domain, the potential of such disclosure is ultimately limited. The most obvious form 
consumers would choose to take less care in their insurance decisions given the interventions described 
herein. Most of these interventions would not appear to the consumer as government interventions, but 
would simply alter the way that information was presented to them in their market interactions.
124  See Glaeser, above n. 12, at 150.
125 Compare Krantz and Kunreuther, above n. 4, at 164 (‘In the preceding, we have emphasized consumer 
education partly in the spirit of libertarian paternalism and partly in the pragmatic belief that the issues 
involved here are too diverse and changeable to permit effective regulation.’ (citation omitted)).
126 See Slovic, above n. 21, at 166 (Although ‘better information about risk is crucial to making better 
personal decisions … it may be quite diffi cult to create effective informational programs. Doing an adequate 
job means fi nding cogent ways of presenting complex, technical material that is clouded by uncertainty 
and subject to distortion by the listener’s preconceptions – or misconceptions – about the hazard and its 
consequences.’). O. Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (Draft, March 
2010), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1567284> (last visited July 14, 
2010).
127 See Glaeser, above n. 12, at 150.
128 This includes both direct disaster insurance and increased use of more general elements of the social 
safety net, such as Medicaid and unemployment insurance.
129 For these reasons, this section focuses on regulatory responses to this component of the bimodal 
demand for high-probability, low-magnitude insurance rather than the inverse potential problem that people 
purchase too much such insurance in certain circumstances.
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of improved disclosure would communicate the actual likelihood of a disaster to 
counteract consumers’ tendency to underestimate risks that are not salient or cognitively 
available.130 Unfortunately, mere numeric disclosures are unlikely to be particularly 
effective. Research suggests that more affect-laden approaches are often necessary to 
trigger consumers’ willingness to consider the purchase of insurance in the sequential 
model of insurance.131 Yet disclosures that sought to ‘scare’ people into purchasing 
insurance would impose a large psychic tax upon both those that chose not to purchase 
insurance and those that capitulated.
 One promising libertarian-paternalistic approach would encourage insurers to offer 
(in addition to any existing options) bundled disaster coverage for several different low-
probability risks, such as fl oods and earthquakes.132 Even if consumers u nderestimated the 
probability of each event individually, the combined probability of any event occurring 
might be suffi cient to overcome the threshold level of probability that inhibits even the 
consideration of insurance in the sequential model of choice.133 The key limitation of 
this proposal is that few consumers face even a small probability of exposure to both 
earthquakes and fl oods, so consumers are likely to consider such bundled insurance 
only in terms of the peril to which they are actually exposed.
 To overcome this limitation, a related proposal would encourage insurers to offer 
(in addition to any existing options) disaster coverage for contract periods longer than 
a year, such as fi ve or even ten years. As with insurance that bundled different types 
of risks, such a policy might overcome errors generated by the sequential model of 
insurance by raising a risk above the requisite threshold for consumers to consider 
insuring against it. As one prominent commentator explains, ‘instead of describing the 
chances of a 100-year fl ood as .01 per year, one could note that an individual living 
in a particular house for 25 years faces a .22 chance of suffering 100-year damage at 
least once’.134 This approach would be more likely than the bundling of different types 
of disaster coverage to overcome threshold probabilities, as most risks do not differ 
substantially intertemporally.135
 An alternative approach is to permit insurers to bundle disaster insurance with other 
forms of insurance that consumers tend to purchase too much of relative to traditional 
EUT.136 Consider one recent proposal designed to increase the purchase of health 
insurance among overly optimistic youths. It would permit – and perhaps even encourage 
– insurers to offer ‘tontines’, which are essentially potential lottery rewards that become 
available if the insured low-probability event does not transpire.137 This strategy seeks to 
130 See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 18, at 14-15 (proposing better disclosure about loss probabilities 
and loading costs as one response to consumers’ tendency not to insure against large losses).
131 See Sunstein and Jolls, above n. 122, at 207-216.
132 See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 18, at 16. A more paternalistic intervention would be to require 
that insurers bundle such insurance with homeowners insurance. See H. Kunreuther and M. Pauly, ‘Rules 
Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina’ (2006) 33 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 101; 
H. Kunreuther, ‘Has the Time Come for Comprehensive National Disaster Insurance?’, in R.J. Daniels, 
D.F. Kettl and H. Kunreuther (eds.), On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina (2006) 
175 at 175-203. This option would deprive consumers of the choice to purchase ordinary homeowners 
insurance without disaster insurance. Given the analysis in Part 2 suggesting that consumers may be making 
defensible choices in deciding not to purchase disaster insurance, such paternalism is harder to justify than 
the interventions suggested here. However, to the extent that libertarian paternalism does not effectively 
induce the purchase of disaster insurance, such interventions may, in fact, be justifi ed, especially given the 
potential externalities associated with the purchase of disaster insurance.
133 See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 18, at 16. One might sensibly object that there is no need for 
regulatory intervention on this ground, as insurers would already be using this bundling strategy to increase 
sales to the extent that it were effective. But this objection ignores the point, made earlier, that insurers 
have various supply-side reasons why they may not want to sell disaster insurance. See section 2.1 supra. 
Additionally, bundled insurance policies would transfer to the insurer the risk of new information surfacing 
during the coverage period that changes the probability or magnitude of the threat. This seems most likely 
for hurricane insurance, where global climate change does appear to be shifting our understanding of the 
underlying risk.
134 See Slovic, above n, 21, at 71.
135 This is not true of all risks, particularly those that may be impacted by global warming.
136 See Slovic, above n. 21, at 71.
137 See Baker and Siegelman, supra note 94, at 5-10.
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counteract underinsurance against catastrophic risks by exploiting consumers’ seeming 
excess enthusiasm for tontines. It also helps counteract the prospect that consumers may 
not be drawn to catastrophe insurance because they incorrectly view it as an investment 
that tends not to pay out.138 This approach has the benefi t of almost completely avoiding 
psychic costs.
3.2 Libertarian Paternalism and Insurance Against Small Risks
Disclosure strategies represent one potentially promising approach to limiting 
consumer mistakes with respect to the purchase of insurance against high-probability, 
low-magnitude risks. One sensible strategy to decrease consumer errors would be to 
require disclosure of the percentage of consumers who actually use the warranties 
they purchase.139 Alternatively, fi rms could be required to disclose the loss ratio – the 
percentage of premiums that are actually used for payouts – of this insurance.140 Both 
approaches would better in form consumers about the expected value of this insurance 
and would, at the very least, help them realise that it is not a good ‘investment’.141
 In addition to improved product  disclosure, consumer mistakes could also be limited 
by individual-use disclosure, which provides consumers with specifi c information about 
their own product use patterns.142 Recall that a primary mistake that consumers may 
make when they purchase insurance against small fi nancial risks is mental accounting, 
in which small risks are not considered in larger context. These errors could be limited 
through strategic use of the disclosures that credit and debit card companies provide to 
consumers.143 Many card providers already provide consumers with an annual summary 
of purchases in different categories.144 One such category is ‘consumer goods’, though 
this category is frequently not broken down any further. Credit and debit card companies 
could be required to separately account for ‘consumer warranties’ and merchants could 
be required to report to the card company any repairs they actually provide under such 
warranties. With these mechanisms in place, consumers could receive an annual and 
fi ve-year summary of the costs and benefi ts of consumer warranties they purchased. 
With some further coordination, these reports could conceivably be aggregated across a 
consumer’s different credit and debit cards.
 This particularised form of disclosure would help consumers overcome some of the 
limitations associated with mental accounting by framing the purchase of consumer 
insurance policies in larger context. Consumers who routinely purchase this form of 
insurance could see the law of large numbers in action. Although such a disclosure 
regime would be unlikely to change behaviour quickly, over time it would allow 
consumers to assess the value of these types of insurance products for themselves. 
Moreover, given advances in information technology, this form of regulation may not 
138 See section 2.1 supra.
139 See B. Nalebuff and I. Aires, Why Not? (2003) at 181 (proposing that fi rms that sell consumer warranties 
inform consumers about the prospect that they will make a claim on those warranties); J. Sovern, ‘Toward 
a New Model of Consumer Protection’ (2006) 47 William and Mary Law Review 1635 at 1635-1644, 1703 
(similar proposal in rebate context).
140 See O. Bar-Gill, ‘Informing Consumers About Themselves’, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper 
No. 07-44 (August 2007) at 33, 53-57, available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1056381> (last visited April 8, 2010).
141 In order to be effective, the number of disclosures must be limited to a small number of truly important 
pieces of information. See generally R. Craswell, ‘Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 565.
142 See Bar-Gill, above n. 140, at 37, 43-60 (exploring the distinction between product characteristic 
disclosures and consumer use-pattern disclosures).
143 This proposal is only a slight variant of the RECAP disclosure proposals that Sunstein and Thaler 
describe in Nudge. See Sunstein and Thaler (2008), above n. 12, at 93-94.
144 See Sunstein and Thaler (2008), above n. 12, at 143.
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be particularly expensive to implement.145 Even if the start-up costs of this disclosure 
regime were signifi cant, they might be appropriate given the amount of money that 
consumers currently spend on product warranties.146
3.3 Libertarian Paternalism and Deductibles
To the extent that consumers are making mistakes by selecting excessively low 
deductibles, traditional disclosure-oriented strategies are not likely to prove effective. 
The basic problem is that the reason why people should prefer high deductibles is hard 
to explain briefl y and simply: it implicates moral hazard, adverse selection and the 
nature of risk aversion. Rather than a straight-forward disclosure, however, government 
regulation could seek to nudge consumers towards purchasing higher deductibles 
through framing effects and forced choice.
 First, insurers could be required to state deductibles in terms of a percentage of 
overall policy limits, in addition to absolute dollars.147 Thus, a homeowners insurance 
policy that provides $250,000 of coverage for a dwelling would be framed as providing 
a deductible of 0.2% of the policy limit, or $500. This framing should communicate to 
policyholders the small amount of risk they currently hold on to and nudge them to think 
about whether they could reasonably retain a larger amount of risk. It should also focus 
them on the analytically-relevant question from the perspective of risk aversion: how 
much risk do they want to retain, and how much do they want to transfer to the insurer?
 Second, insurers could be required to offer any deductible up to at least 5% of 
policy limits and to provide consumers with an initial set of prices for deductibles 
of 0.5%, 1% and 2%.148 Doing so would obviously increase consumer choice. More 
importantly, though, it would increase consumer awareness regarding the potential cost 
savings associated with higher deductibles – most consumer insurance markets are quite 
competitive on price,149 so insurers would likely be forced to pass on to consumers 
the lower costs of high-deductible policies. Additionally, decision-making research has 
found that people often tend to select ‘middle’ options when they are given multiple 
options arrayed along a spectrum.150 Forcing insurers to increase the number of choices 
at the upper range of plausible deductible values should consequently increase the 
percentage of consumers who select a higher deductible.
 Third, and fi nally, insurers could be required to disclose the percentage of consumers 
who take advantage of small deductibles in the event of small claims. Research suggests 
145 At present, much of the relevant information is already sorted and presented to consumers by credit card 
companies. It would certainly not be diffi cult to require these companies to separately break down payments 
for warranties. However, it might well be costly to require card companies that do not already provide an 
annual summary to do so. Perhaps even more importantly, it might be costly to create a system whereby 
merchants kept track of which cards consumers used to make purchases and reported back any repairs 
associated with those warranties. Many merchants currently do store the card information of consumers for 
purposes of data analysis and facilitating returns, but it is unclear how diffi cult it would be to require them 
to report repair expenses back to the card company.
146 See T. Chen et al., ‘Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Service Contracts?’ (2009) 36 Journal of 
Consumer Research 611 (stating that consumers spent approximately $15 billion dollars on extended 
service contracts in 2005 and that consumers spent $8.3 billion dollars on warranties for computers, 
computer electronics and major appliances alone in 2007).
147 See O.R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (1995) (noting that survey respondents 
often believe that foreign aid is too high when told of the absolute number, but think that it is too low when 
told of the percentage of GDP that went to foreign aid).
148 Yet another option is to require that insurers disclose the percentage of consumers choosing each 
deductible option. See I. Ayres et al., ‘Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments That Peer Comparison 
Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. 15386 (September 2009). Of course, this is only a sensible idea if other reforms begin to encourage 
consumers to choose larger deductibles.
149 See S. Harrington, ‘Effects of Prior Approval Rate Regulation in Auto Insurance’, in J.D. Cummins 
(ed.), Deregulating Property-Liability Insurance (2002) at 285; S. D’Arcy, ‘Insurance Price Deregulation: 
The Illinois Experience’, in J.D. Cummins (ed.), Deregulating Property-Liability Insurance (2002) at 248.
150 See, for example, E. Shafi r et al., ‘Reason-based Choice’, in W.M. Goldstein and R.M. Hogarth (eds.), 
Research on Judgment and Decision Making: Currents, Connections and Controversies (1997) 69, at 83.
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that many consumers choose not to make a claim when their loss is not substantially larger 
than their deductible, because they worry that doing so will increase future premiums.151 
If insurers were forced to disclose an estimate of how frequently this occurred, many 
consumers would presumably realise that the true cost of a low deductible is not just in 
the additional premium that is paid upfront but also in the additional premium that will 
be paid in the future as a result of taking advantage of this low deductible when small 
claims occur.
 These strategies should be relatively costless to adopt and nudge people towards 
decisions that are more consistent with standard theory. At the same time, this approach 
should produce virtually no psychic tax and does not prevent sophisticated consumers 
from continuing to opt for low deductibles.
3.4 Libertarian Paternalism and Non-Pecuniary Loss Insurance
Libertarian-paternalistic interventions can also limit mistakes concerning non-pecuniary 
loss insurance. In the juvenile life insurance market, improved disclosure is the most 
obvious intervention.152 Insurers could be required to disclose the projected decreased 
costs associated with the death of a child, especially for families saving for college 
expenses. Perhaps less controversially, insurers could be required to disclose the legal 
protections afforded to grieving parents, including the possibility of FMLA leave in 
the event of depression and the requirement of mental health parity in many health 
insurance policies. To the extent that demand for this form of insurance stems from 
consumers’ confusion of emotional and fi nancial loss, insurers might be required to 
disclose how policyholders typically use their insurance proceeds after a child’s death.
 Unfortunately, these disclosure strategies pose a potentially large risk of creating 
a psychic tax. Asking people to imagine the relative value of money in the event of 
their child’s death may itself generate unpleasant emotions. This is true irrespective 
of whether the disclosure dissuades them from purchasing such insurance. It is also 
possible, though perhaps unlikely, that this approach would signal that insurance is 
somehow an inappropriate form of consolation, thereby undermining the potential value 
that some people genuinely experience when they receive insurance proceeds after a 
non-fi nancial loss. Finally, disclosure strategies of this type might end up having the 
incidental effect of discouraging the purchase of other forms of insurance – such as 
ordinary life insurance – that are sold by the same agents, even when government policy 
ought to nudge people towards purchasing more, rather than less, of such coverage.
 Less affect-laden contexts are more amenable to effective libertarian-paternalistic 
interventions that reduce consumer errors regarding non-pecuniary loss insurance 
without imposing psychic taxes. Consider the purchase of Uninsured/Underinsured 
Motorists insurance. Here, insurers could be required to offer consumers the option of 
less extensive UIM insurance that covers only pecuniary tort damages but not pain and 
suffering damages. Additionally, regulators could insist that consumers who wish to 
purchase complete UIM coverage, which would include emotional distress damages, 
do so through an endorsement. That structure – which has already been tried in New 
Jersey153 – effectively sets the default as limited UIM insurance that covers only 
pecuniary losses and requires consumers seeking non-pecuniary loss insurance to opt 
out of this default. Because consumers often do not opt out of defaults (referred to as 
‘status quo bias’), this approach could nudge consumers away from paying for non-
pecuniary loss insurance while simultaneously preserving their freedom to do so.154 
In New Jersey, only 20% of drivers opted out of the default to full UIM coverage. 
151 See Kunreuther and Pauly, above n. 13, at 29.
152 As before, the effectiveness of such disclosure regulation hinges on the avoidance of excessive 
disclosure. See n. 141.
153 The New Jersey scheme did permit suit for non-economic damages in the case of a few statutorily 
defi ned serious injuries. For a more detailed overview of both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania schemes, 
see J. Yeh and J. Schmit, ‘Auto Insurance Claims in New Jersey’, in E.L. Lascher and M.R. Powers (eds.), 
The Economics and Politics of Choice in No-Fault Insurance (2001) at 139-157.
154 See Sunstein and Thaler (2008), above n. 12, at 8, 12-13.
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Compare this to Pennsylvania, where consumers who did not want full UIM coverage 
were required to select an endorsement in exchange for a partial refund. Required to 
opt out in order to select the more limited coverage, 75% of consumers stuck with the 
default of full UIM insurance.155
4 Conclusion
Decisions about insurance are among the most diffi cult that consumers face.156 They 
require individualised predictions about the likelihood and magnitude of highly unlikely, 
and largely unfamiliar, future events. Faced with such complex decisions, it is hardly 
surprising that consumers frequently make mistakes. At the same time, insurance is a 
complicated and emotionally-laden product, and simplistic explanations of consumer 
behaviour seriously risk undermining some of the genuine value that insurance provides 
to consumers. Libertarian paternalism, which encourages presumptively reasonable 
insurance decisions while preserving choice, has an under-explored potential to navigate 
these competing interests. 
155 See Kunreuther and Krantz, above n. 4, at 160.
156 See H. Jackson, ‘ Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay’ 
(1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 319, at 330-31.

